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Abstract
We present our results on Uniform Price Auctions, one of the standard sealed-bid multi-
unit auction formats, for selling multiple identical units of a single good to multi-demand
bidders. Contrary to the truthful and economically efficient multi-unit Vickrey auction, the
Uniform Price Auction encourages strategic bidding and is socially inefficient in general, partly
because of a ”Demand Reduction” effect; bidders tend to bid for fewer (identical) units, so
as to receive them at a lower uniform price. Despite its inefficiency, the uniform pricing rule
is widely popular by its appeal to the natural anticipation, that identical items should be
identically priced. Application domains of its variants include sales of U.S. Treasury notes to
investors, trade exchanges over the internet facilitated by popular online brokers, allocation
of radio spectrum licenses etc.
In this work we study equilibria of the Uniform Price Auction for bidders with (symmetric)
submodular valuation functions, over the number of units that they win. We investigate pure
Nash equilibria of the auction in undominated strategies; we produce a characterization of
these equilibria that allows us to prove that a fraction 1− e−1 of the optimum social welfare
is always recovered in undominated pure Nash equilibrium – and this bound is essentially
tight. Subsequently, we study the auction under the incomplete information setting and
prove a bound of 4 − 2
k
on the economic inefficiency of (mixed) Bayes Nash equilibria that
are supported by undominated strategies.
∗Work supported by the research project “DDCOD” (PE6-213). The research project is implemented within
the framework of the Action “Supporting Postdoctoral Researchers” of the Operational Program “Education and
Lifelong Learning” (Actions Beneficiary: General Secretariat for Research and Technology), and is co-financed by
the European Social Fund (ESF) and the Greek State.
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1 Introduction
We study the Uniform Price Auction, a standard multi-unit auction format, for allocating multiple
units of a single good to multi-demand bidders within a single auction process. Multi-unit auctions
are being applied in a variety of diverse trade exchanges, including online sales over the Internet
held by various brokers [24], allocation of radio spectrum licenses [21], sales of U.S. Treasury notes
to investors [25], and allocation of advertisement slots on Internet sites [8]. The particular feature
of the Uniform Price Auction is a single price for every unit allocated to any bidder; this makes it a
proper representative of a wider category of uniform pricing auctions, as opposed to discriminatory
pricing ones, that sell identical units of a single item at different prices [24, 16]). As observed by
Milgrom in [21], resurgence of interest in auction design is owed to a large extent to the success
of multi-unit and – particularly – uniform price auction formats. Charging a uniform price for
identical items, apart from appealing to the intuitive anticipation that identical items should be
identically priced, it eases the worries of proxy agents that bid on behalf of their employers; they
do not have to explain why they did not achieve a better price than their competitors.
The design of mechanisms for auctioning multiple units of a single good to multi-demand
bidders dates back to the seminal work of Vickrey [33]. Since then, three sealed-bid standard
multi-unit auction formats have been identified in Auction Theory [16] [Chapter 12]: the Multi-
Unit Vickrey Auction, the Uniform Price Auction, and the Discriminatory Price Auction. A
significant volume of research in economics has been dedicated to identifying the properties of
these standard formats [23, 9, 1, 28, 3]. All three auctions have the same (sealed) bidding format
and allocation rule, and have been studied mostly for bidders with “downward sloping” (symmetric
submodular [17]) valuations; these prescribe that the marginal value that a bidder has for each
additional unit is non-increasing. Therefore each bidder is asked to issue such a non-increasing
sequence of marginal bids for the k available units. The k highest marginal bids win the auction and
each winning bid grants its issuing bidder a distinct unit. The Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction charges
according to an instantiation of the Clarke payment rule [6] and is a generalization of Vickrey’s
celebrated single-item Second-Price mechanism. The Discriminatory Price Auction charges the
winning bids as payments and it is a generalization of the First-Price Auction. The Uniform
Price Auction, proposed by Friedman [12], charges per allocated unit the highest rejected (losing)
marginal bid. Among these three formats, the Multi-Unit Vickrey Auction for submodular bidders
retains the characteristics of the single-item Second-Price Mechanism, i.e., optimizes the Social
Welfare and is truthful (it is a –weakly – dominant strategy for every bidder to report his marginal
values truthfully). Neither the Discriminatory nor the Uniform Price auctions are truthful; they
encourage strategic bidding.
One of the downsides of the Uniform Price Auction is the effect of Demand Reduction, observed
in [23, 9] and formalized in a general model for multi-unit auctions by Ausubel and Cramton [1].
Bidders may have an incentive to shade their marginal bids for some units, only to win fewer
ones in a lower uniform price. This effect leads to diminished revenue and inefficient allocations
in equilibrium. In particular, it is known that the socially optimal allocation cannot be generally
implemented in an equilibrium in (weakly) undominated strategies. Despite this effect, the variants
of the Uniform Price Auction have seen extensive applications, contrary to the Vickrey auction,
which has been largely overlooked in practice; implementations of variants of the standard format
are offered by several online brokers 1 [24, 15] and are also being used for sales of U.S. Treasury
notes to investors since 1992 [25]. We also note that despite the Demand Reduction effect, the
Uniform Price Auction does retain some interesting characteristics: overbidding any marginal
value is a weakly dominated strategy, and so is any misreport of the marginal bid for the first
unit.
In this work we give a detailed account of the properties of undominated pure Nash equilibria
for the Uniform Price Auction, when bidders have submodular valuation functions. Subsequently,
we study the economic inefficiency of pure Nash and mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria, incurred by
the effect of demand reduction in the former case, and by demand reduction and incomplete
1Among them, eBay ceased its own variant in 2009.
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information in the latter.
Contribution. We study pure Nash and (mixed) Bayes-Nash equilibria of the Uniform Price
Auction. We focus first on bidders with submodular valuation functions and in Section 4 we
give a detailed description of (pure) undominated strategies in the standard model of Uniform
Price Auctions. Although these properties are mentioned or partially derived in previous works
on Uniform Price Auctions, our analysis aims at clarifying some ambiguity between assumptions
and implications. Additionally, we give a characterization of a subset of pure Nash equilibria in
undominated strategies, that facilitates our analysis of economic inefficiency later on.
In Section 5, we study the social inefficiency of pure Nash equilibria (PNE) for submodular bid-
ders, in undominated strategies, i.e., the Price of Anarchy (PoA) over the subset of such equilibria.
We derive an upper bound of ee−1 , which states that the auction recovers in (undominated) PNE
at least a fraction 1− e−1 of the welfare of the socially optimal allocation. We note here that the
auction does have a socially optimal equilibrium (discussed in Section 3, but not in undominated
strategies; undominated PNE are known to be socially inefficient in general. As noted earlier,
this is largely due to the effect of Demand Reduction [1], whereby a bidder shades his bids for
additional units, so as to pay a lower price for the units he wins. Our analysis can thus be viewed
as a quantification of this effect. For any number of units k ≥ 9, we provide an almost matching
lower bound, equal to
(
1− e−1 + 2k
)−1
. We also discuss the social inefficiency of the auction for
k < 9 units.
In Section 6, we consider (mixed) Bayes-Nash equilibria in the incomplete information model of
Harsanyi. For mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria that emerge from randomized bidding strategy profiles
containing only undominated pure strategies in their support, we prove an upper bound of 4− 2k
on the Price of Anarchy2.
2 Related Work
Mult-Unit Auctions. The Uniform Price Auction has received significant attention within the
economics community. Noussair [23] and Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Kahn [9] gave characterizations
of pure Bayes-Nash equilibria under the model of independent private values of bidders, drawn
from continuous distributions. They also made some initial observations on the effect of demand
reduction. Ausubel and Cramton formalized demand reduction for a more general model of multi-
unit auctions in [1], that allows also interdependent private values. Bresky showed in [3] existence
of pure Bayes-Nash equilibria in the independent private values model (with continuous valuation
distributions) for a large class of multi-unit auctions, including all three standard formats.
Simultaneous Auctions. There has been a growing recent interest in the computer science com-
munity in analyzing auction schemes that – although not necessarily truthful – have an appealing
simplicity and appear to achieve increased economic efficiency in equilibrium, compared to what is
achievable with truthful mechanisms [5, 2, 14, 13, 18]. Our work presents conceptual and technical
resemblance to these works.
Christodoulou, Kova´cs and Schapira initialized in [5] the study of Simultaneous Auctions for
bidders with combinatorial demands, where they proposed that, a set of distinct goods is sold
by having an independent single-good Second-Price auction for each of them in parallel. For
bidders with fractionally subadditive valuation functions (see [10] for a definition), they prove a
tight bound of 2 for the Price of Anarchy, even for (mixed) Bayes-Nash equilibria. They show how
pure Nash equilibria can be computed efficiently for submodular valuation functions and describe
an iterative best response algorithm that converges to a pure Nash equilibrium for fractionally
subadditive ones. Bhawalkar and Roughgarden proved in [2] an upper bound of 2 on the Price of
Anarchy of pure Nash equilibria, for bidders with subadditive valuation functions. Feldman et al.
proved for this same setting an upper bound of 4 on the Price of Anarchy of mixed Bayes-Nash
equilibria (thus, improving on a previous bound of O(logm) from [2]). Finally, Fu, Kleinberg and
2This improves over a bound of O(log k) from [20] and over a bound of 4e
e−1 , shown subsequently in [32].
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Lavi [13] showed recently a tight upper bound of 2 on the Price of Anarchy of pure Nash equilibria
(when they exist), for arbitrary valuation functions.
Hassidim et al. [14] considered simultaneous First-Price auctions; first, they showed that pure
Nash equilibria are efficient, when they exist, for arbitrary valuation functions. For fractionally
subadditive valuation functions they proved upper bounds of 2 and 4 for the pure and mixed
Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy respectively. For subadditive and arbitrary valuation functions their
corresponding upper bounds are O(logm) and O(m). Feldman et al. [11] and Syrgkanis [30]
improved the upper bound of the mixed Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy to respectively: 2, for
subadditive valuation functions and ee−1 , for fractionally subadditive ones.
Sequential and Greedy Auctions. Very recently, Syrgkanis and Tardos studied in [18] se-
quential First- and Second-Price auctions, motivated by the practical issue that supply may not
be readily available at once. They showed that sequential First-Price auctions are efficient in
subgame-perfect equilibrium. In [31] they extended their results in the incomplete information
setting. Lucier and Borodin [19] analyzed the social inefficiency at (mixed) Bayes-Nash equilib-
rium, of combinatorial auctions for multiple distinct goods, incorporating Greedy allocation algo-
rithms (and using appropriate adaptations of “first” and “second” pricing rules). They showed
that these auctions have Price of Anarchy fairly comparable to the approximation factors of the
greedy allocation algorithms, for the underlying welfare optimization problem.
Truthful Mechanism Design. From the mechanism design perspective, Vickrey designed in [33]
the first truthful mechanism for auctioning multiple units “in one go”, so as to maximize the social
welfare. The Vickrey multi-unit auction is computationally efficient for a bounded number of
units. Since then, computationally efficient truthful approximation mechanisms for multi-demand
bidders were given by Mu’alem and Nisan in [22] and by Dobzinski and Nisan in [7]. These works
considered several different classes of valuation functions, much more general than symmetric
submodular ones. Very recently, Vo¨cking gave a randomized universally truthful polynomial-time
approximation scheme for bidders with general valuations [34] (a universally truthful mechanism
is a probability distribution over deterministic truthful mechanisms), thus almost closing the
problem. It is worth noting that in these works, the bids are accessed by the allocation algorithms
through polynomially bounded many value queries to the bidders, for specific bundles of items
(with the exception being the case of k-minded bidders, who have non-zero value for at most k
sizes of bundles).
3 Definitions and Preliminaries
We consider auctioning k units of a single good to a set of n bidders, denoted by [n]. Every
bidder i ∈ [n] has a private valuation function, defined over the quantity of units he receives, i.e.,
vi : ({0} ∪ [k]) 7→ <+, i = 1, . . . , n, where vi(0) = 0 and each vi is non-decreasing. In this work we
consider submodular valuation functions:
Definition 1 A valuation function f : ({0}∪[k]) 7→ <+ is called submodular, if for every x < y,
f(x)− f(x− 1) ≥ f(y)− f(y − 1).
Proposition 1 Given x, y ∈ [k] with x ≤ y, any submodular valuation function f satisfies
f(x)/x ≥ f(y)/y.
Any non-decreasing valuation function v : ({0} ∪ [k]) 7→ R+ with v(0) = 0 can be specified
also as a vector of marginal values (m(1),m(2), . . . ,m(k)), where m(j) = v(j) − v(j − 1). If v is
submodular, then m(1) ≥ m(2) ≥ · · · ≥ m(k). We write mi(·) for the marginal value function of
bidder i.
The Uniform Price Auction The standard Uniform Price Auction format requires that each
bidder i declares his whole valuation curve, by submitting a vector bi of marginal bids, bi =
(bi(1), bi(2), . . . , bi(k)), satisfying bi(1) ≥ bi(2) ≥ · · · ≥ bi(k). Here bi(j) is the declared marginal
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value of i, for obtaining the j-th unit of the good. Given a bidding configuration b = (b1, . . . ,bn),
the allocation algorithm produces an allocation x(b) = (x1(b), x2(b), . . . , xn(b)), as follows: each
of the k highest issued marginal bids grants a unit to its issuing bidder. After the allocation is
completed, every bidder i pays a uniform price p(b) per received unit, which equals the highest
rejected (marginal) bid. That is, if under bidding configuration b, bidder i is allocated xi(b) units
in total and the uniform price is p(b), i pays a total of xi(b) · p(b). The utility that i derives
under b is ui(b) = vi(xi(b))−xi(b) · p(b). Given a bidding profile b, we will denote by βj(b) the
j-th lowest winning (maginal) bid, for j = 1, . . . , k, i.e., the lowest winning bid is β1(b) and the
highest one is βk(b).
For submodular bidders, the Uniform Price Auction admits an efficient pure Nash equilibrium;
let x∗ = (x∗1, ..., x
∗
n) be an optimal allocation
3 of units to the bidders. Consider the profile where
any winner i of at least one unit in x∗ bids bi = (mi(1), ...,mi(x∗i ), 0, ..., 0) and any loser bids the
zero vector. It is straightforward to verify that this a Nash equilibrium. However, the strategies
of losing bidders in this profile are weakly dominated, as we shall see.
Pure Nash equilibria in undominated strategies are known to suffer from a demand reduc-
tion effect [1]; bidders may have an incentive to understate their marginal increase for the j-th
unit onwards, for some j > 1. This implies that equilibria in undominated strategies are gener-
ally inefficient. We show that, despite this effect, the Uniform Price Auction does quite well in
approximating the optimal Social Welfare.
Incomplete Information. In Section 6 we will move to an incomplete information setting,
where each bidder faces uncertainty over the other bidders’ valuation functions. In particular, we
will assume that every bidder i ∈ [n] obtains his type/valuation function from a finite set Vi of
valuation functions, through a discrete probability distribution pii : Vi 7→ [0, 1], independently of
the rest of the biddders; for any particular v ∈ Vi we write v ∼ pii to signify that it is drawn
randomly from distribution pii. The valuation function of every bidder is private. A valuation
profile v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V = ×iVi is drawn from a publicly known distribution pi = ×ipii,
pi : V 7→ [0, 1]. We write accordingly v ∼ pi.
Every bidder i knows his own valuation function vi – drawn from Vi according to pii, but
does not know the valuation function vi′ drawn by any other bidder i
′ 6= i. Bidder i may only
use his knowledge of pi to estimate v−i. Given the publicly known distribution pi, the (possibly
mixed) strategy of every bidder is a function of his own valuation vi, denoted by Bi(vi). Bi
maps a valuation function vi ∈ Vi to a distribution Bi(vi) = Bvii , over all possible bid vectors
(strategies) for i. In this case we will write bi ∼ Bvii , for any particular bid vector bi drawn
from this distribution. We also use the notation B
v−i
−i , to refer to the vector of randomized
strategies of bidders other than i, under valuation profile v−i for these bidders. A Bayes-Nash
equilibrium (BNE) is a strategy profile B = (B1, . . . , Bn) such that, for every bidder i and for
every valuation vi, Bi(vi) maximizes the utility of i in expectation, over the distribution of the
other bidders’ valuation functions w−i given vi and over the distribution of i’s own and the other
bidders’ strategies, B(vi,w−i). That is, for every pure strategy ci of i:
Ew−i|vi
[
E
b∼B(vi,w−i)
[
ui(b)
]]
≥ Ew−i|vi
[
Eb−i∼Bw−i
[
ui(ci,b−i)
]]
where we use the notation Ev and Ew−i|vi to denote the expectation over the distribution pi and
over pi(·|vi) respectively, i.e., given vi (instead of using Ev∼pi and Ew−i∼pi(·|vi), since the analysis
is always in the context of pi and pii).
Fix a valuation profile v ∈ V and consider a (mixed) bidding configuration Bv, under v. The
Social Welfare SW (Bv) under Bv is defined in expectation over the bidding profiles chosen by
the bidders collectively, from their randomized strategies:
3It is known that for submodular valuation functions on identical units, the allocation algorithm of the Uniform
Price Auction produces an optimal allocation when bidders bid truthfully. This property does not hold in the case
of non-identical items, where only a 2-approximation is achieved [17].
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SW (Bv) = Eb∼Bv
[∑
i
vi(xi(b))
]
The expected Social Welfare in Bayes-Nash Equilibrium is Ev∼pi[SW (Bv)]. The socially optimal
assignment under valuation profile v ∈ V will be denoted by xv. The expected optimal social
welfare is then Ev[SW (xv)], by slight abuse of notation. Under these definitions, we will be
studying the Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy, i.e., the worst case ratio Ev[SW (xv)]/Ev[SW (Bv)]
over all possible distributions pi and Bayes-Nash equilibria B.
As in previous works [5, 11], we ensure existence of Bayes-Nash equilibria in our auction
format by assuming that bidders have bounded and finite strategy spaces, e.g., derived through
discretization. Our bounds on the Bayesian inefficiency hold for sufficiently fine discretizations
(see also the discussion in Appendix D of [11]).
4 Undominated Equilibria
In this work we consider only bidders with submodular valuation functions, so that mi(1) ≥
... ≥ mi(k), for every bidder i. As already explained in Section 3, the bidding interface of the
Uniform Price Auction requires that each bidder submits a sequence of non-increasing marginal
bids bi = (bi(1), . . . , bi(k)), with bi(1) ≥ bi(2) ≥ · · · ≥ bi(k) (see e.g., the related chapters in [16]
and [21]). By the auction’s definition, it follows that, under any strategy profile b, the uniform
price p(b) never exceeds any of the winning (marginal) bids.
Lemmas 1 and 2 below state two well known facts about the Uniform Price Auction with
submodular bidders (see e.g., [16, 21]). For the sake of clarity and completeness, we state them and
prove them here to clarify some ambiguities and emphasize their dependence on the requirement
that bidders issue non-increasing marginal bids. Their proofs are provided in Appendix A.
Lemma 1 For bidders with submodular valuation functions, and for any j ∈ [k], it is a weakly
dominated strategy to declare a bid bi(j) with bi(j) > mi(j).
An assumption that is recently being used in various other auction formats is that bidders do
not overbid their value for a set of goods (e.g., [2, 4, 5, 27]). The justification for this is that such
strategies may be dominated by other strategies and hence should be avoided. In our context,
this would mean that for any number of r units,
∑r
j=1 bi(j) ≤ vi(r) =
∑r
j=1mi(j). We note
here that Lemma 1 shows that a weakly undominated strategy in our setting implies a stricter
notion of conservative behavior than the usual “no-overbidding” assumption of the literature. To
distinguish from the usual no-overbidding assumption, we call a bidder i who does not bid beyond
mi(j) for any j ∈ [k] conservative in marginal values.
Lemma 2 In an undominated strategy, a bidder with a submodular valuation, never declares a
bid bi(1) 6= vi(1).
We now give a characterization of a subset of undominated pure Nash equilibria, which will be
utilized for the analysis of their social inefficiency in Section 5.
Lemma 3 Let b be a pure Nash equilibrium strategy profile of the Uniform Price Auction in
undominated strategies for submodular bidders, with uniform price p(b). There always exists a
pure Nash equilibrium b′ in undominated strategies, satisfying x(b′) = x(b) and:
1. b′i(x) = mi(x), for every bidder i and every x ≤ xi(b).
2. p(b′) ≤ p(b) and p(b′) is either 0 or equal to vi(1) for some bidder i.
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Proof. Since b is an equilibrium in undominated strategies, for every bidder i we have bi(1) =
vi(1). Also, bi(x) ≤ mi(x) for every x ≥ 2. For every winning marginal bid bi(x) of any bidder
i and for x = 2, . . . , xi(b), we may set b
′
i(x) = mi(x) without altering neither the uniform price
nor the units obtained by the winners under b. This is because the losing bids remain unchanged
whereas the winning bids only increase, hence the price is the same as before. Finally, the new
profile is easily shown to be an equilibrium simply because we started with an equilibrium b. Thus
the first condition b′i(x) = mi(x) for x ≤ xi(b) can be satisfied for every winner i.
For the second condition, consider an equilibrium b satisfying the first condition. Assume
that b is such that p(b) = bi(j), for some j ≥ 1. If j = 1, then it must be xi(b) = 0 and then
p(b) = bi(1) = vi(1), because b is undominated. Consider the case where j ≥ 2. Then xi(b) ≥ 1.
If the value bi(j) = p(b) is unique in b, then either p(b) = 0, or i could lower all his marginal bids
for the j-th unit and onwards to 0. This way, he would strictly increase his utility, by lowering the
uniform price to the next highest marginal bid, which contradicts that b is a PNE. Thus we may
assume that more than one highest losing bids of the same value exist, that determine the price.
If none of them are equal to vi(1) for some i, we can zero out the bids of all bidders who have the
highest losing bid (from that bid onwards) and again obtain a bidding configuration b′ with a price
p(b′) < p(b). The new vector b′ is still an undominated PNE. The utilities of all winners have
now increased, but none of them may increase his utility more by deviating unilaterally, because
we have not altered any of the winning bids. It is the last winning bid that will determine the new
uniform price in case of any bidder trying to win an extra unit by deviating. But since there was
no incentive to do such a deviation under b the same is true for b′ too. Hence, we have managed
to reduce the price and have some bidders zero out their losing bids. We can repeat this procedure
for the configuration b′, until we reach a a configuration satisfying the second property. 2
5 Inefficiency of Undominated Pure Nash Equilibria
We develop a welfare guarantee for pure Nash equilibria in undominated strategies, of the Uniform
Price Auction, for bidders with submodular valuation functions. Recall that, given a configuration
b, we denote the (k highest) winning bids by βj(b), j = 1, . . . , k, so that β1(b) ≤ β2(b) ≤ · · · ≤
βk(b). We extend this notation to partial configurations b−i for any bidder i ∈ [n].
Let x∗ = (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) be a socially optimal allocation and b be a bidding configuration cor-
responding to an undominated pure Nash equilibrium of the auction. Under b the allocation is
x(b) = (x1(b), . . . , xn(b)). To simplify notation we use x for x(b) and xi for xi(b). Given any
allocation x, define the setW(x) = {i|xi ≥ 1} to be the subset of winners, i.e. bidders that receive
at least one item unit. We also define 3 additional sets, W0(x),W1(x),W2(x), all with reference
to x∗ as follows:
W0(x) = {i ∈ W(x∗)|xi ≥ x∗i }, W1(x) = {i ∈ W(x∗)|xi < x∗i },
and W2(x) =W(x) \
(
W0(x) ∪W1(x)
)
.
We note that given any assignment x = x(b) for a pure Nash equilibrium configuration b,
W0(x) ∪W1(x) ∪W2(x) is a partition of W(x), given the assumption of undominated strategies
about b; every winner i ∈ W(x∗) will still be a winner also under b, because of specifying his vi(1)
truthfully (by Lemma 2), thus obtaining at least one unit. Hence none of W0(x), W1(x), W2(x)
may contain non-winning bidders of x. First we present a general upper bound on the Price of
Anarchy for undominated pure Nash equilibria.
Lemma 4 Let b denote any undominated pure Nash equilibrium of a Uniform Price Auction for
k units and x∗ be an assignment that maximizes the social welfare. The Price of Anarchy is:
PoA ≤ sup
b
max
i:x∗i−xi(b)>0
vi(x∗i ) ·
vi(xi(b))+ x∗i−xi(b)∑
j=1
βj(b)
−1
 (1)
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The proof of the lemma is given in Appendix B. We can now present our constant bound on the
Price of Anarchy:
Theorem 1 The Uniform Price Auction recovers in undominated pure Nash equilibrium a frac-
tion of at least 1 − e−1 of the optimal Social Welfare, for multi-demand bidders with symmetric
submodular valuation functions.
Proof. Without loss of generality, it suffices to upper bound the social inefficiency of undominated
equilibria b satisfying the properties of Lemma 3. Let p(b) be the uniform price payed under
equilibrium b, i.e. the value of the highest losing (marginal) bid. In order to estimate a lower
bound on the Social Welfare of b, we consider possible deviations of bidders i ∈ W1(x(b)). We
may assume that W1(x(b)) 6= ∅ for, otherwise, W0(x(b)) =W(x∗) and b is socially optimal, i.e.
SW (b) = SW (x∗).
For every bidder i ∈ W1(x(b)), define ri(b) = x∗i − xi(b). For every bidder i ∈ W1(x(b))
and for every value j = 1, . . . , ri(b), there exists a deviation that will grant him j more units,
additionally to the ones he already wins under b; this is justified by the fact that at equilibrium
b, all bidders play marginal bids equal to their actual marginal values, or 0 (as prescribed by the
properties given in Lemma 3). Since the optimal assignment results from a simple sorting of the
actual marginal values, every winner i ∈ W(x∗) may feasibly deviate under b, so as to obtain any
total number of units between xi and x
∗
i . A deviation of i ∈ W1(x(b)) for obtaining any number
of j = 1, . . . , ri(b) additional units will raise the uniform price to exactly βj(b) and cannot be
profitable for i, i.e.:
vi(xi(b) + j)− (xi(b) + j) · βj(b) ≤ vi(xi(b))− xi(b) · p(b)
To simplify notation, we use hereafter xi for xi(b), p for p(b), ri for ri(b), and βj for βj(b),
(always with respect to an undominated pure Nash equilibrium b).
Then we deduce that for every i ∈ W(x∗):
βj ≥ 1
j + xi
·
(
vi(xi + j)− vi(xi) + xi · p
)
, for j = 1, . . . , ri (2)
We can now proceed to upper bound (1) from Lemma 4, using (2) as follows:
vi(xi) +
ri∑
j=1
βj ≥ vi(xi) +
ri∑
j=1
1
j + xi
·
(
vi(xi + j)− vi(xi)
)
(3)
= vi(xi) +
ri∑
j=1
(
j
j + xi
· vi(xi + j)− vi(xi)
j
)
≥ vi(xi) + vi(x
∗
i )− vi(xi)
x∗i − xi
·
ri∑
j=1
j
j + xi
(4)
= vi(xi) +
vi(x
∗
i )− vi(xi)
x∗i − xi
·
x∗i − xi − xi · ri∑
j=1
1
j + xi

= vi(x
∗
i )−
vi(x
∗
i )− vi(xi)
x∗i − xi
· xi ·
ri∑
j=1
1
j + xi
(5)
≥
1− xi
x∗i
·
ri∑
j=1
1
j + xi
 · vi(x∗i ) ≥
(
1− xi
x∗i
·
∫ x∗i
xi
1
y
dy
)
· vi(x∗i ) (6)
=
(
1 +
xi
x∗i
· ln xi
x∗i
)
· vi(x∗i ) ≥ (1− e−1) · vi(x∗i ) (7)
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(3) occurs by substitution of βj from (2) and after dropping the xi · p ≥ 0 term. (4) follows by
submodularity of the valuation functions, particularly that vi(xi+j)−vi(xi)j ≥ vi(x
∗
i )−vi(xi)
x∗i−xi , for any
j = 1, . . . , ri where ri = x
∗
i−xi. For (6) we used vi(x
∗
i )−vi(xi)
x∗i−xi ≤
vi(x
∗
i )
x∗i
, given vi(0) = 0; we bounded
the sum of harmonic terms with the integral, using
∑n
k=m f(k) ≤
∫ n
m−1 f(x)dx, for a monotonically
decreasing positive function. We obtain the final result by minimizing f(y) = 1 + y ln y over (0, 1)
for y = e−1. The claimed bound for the Price of Anarchy follows by Lemma 4. 2
We will produce an almost matching lower bound for the result of theorem 1, which holds for any
number of units k ≥ 9. We pause here to discuss first three simple tight examples for k = 2, 3, 4
units.
Examples. We give a detailed example for k = 3 first. We show a simple lower bound of 1813 .
Consider 3 item units and 3 bidders, with valuation functions v1(x) = x, v2(x) =
2
3 , v3(x) =
1
2 .
The socially optimal welfare is 3, where bidder 1 gets all the units. Consider the pure Nash
equilibrium configuration b1 = (1, 0, 0), b2 = (
2
3 , 0, 0) and b3 = (
1
2 , 0, 0), for j = 1, 2, 3. None
of bidders 2 and 3 have incentive to change their bid, as their utility cannot improve. Should
bidder 1 raise b1(2) = 0 to b
′
1(2) >
1
2 , he would win one more unit additionally to x1(b) = 1,
but pay x1(b
′) × 12 = 1, thus not improving his utility. If bidder 1 would raise b1(2) = 0 to
b′1(2) >
2
3 and b1(3) = 0 to b
′
1(3) >
1
2 , he would still not improve his utility; it would be u1(b
′) =
v1(xi(b
′))− xi(b′)× 23 = 3− 3× 23 = 1 = u1(b). The Price of Anarchy in this example is 1813 .
For k = 2 and k = 4 our examples follow a similar pattern to the one discussed for k = 3.
We can take n = k = 2 bidders with valuation functions v1(x) = x and v2(x) =
1
2 . This instance
yields a Price of Anarchy at least 43 ; in the social optimum, bidder 1 gets both units, while in
the (undominated) equilibrium profile, b1 = (1, 0), b2 = (
1
2 , 0) (and SW (b) =
3
2 ). For k = 4, we
take n = k = 4 bidders with valuation functions v1(x) = x, v2(x) =
1
2 , v3(x) =
2
3 , v4(x) =
3
4 .
In the social optimum we obtain welfare 4, by giving all units to bidder 1. For an undominated
equilibrium profile, take b1 = (1, 0, 0, 0), b2 = (
1
2 , 0, 0, 0), b3 = (
2
3 , 0, 0, 0), b4 = (
3
4 , 0, 0, 0). Then,
SW (b) = 35/12 and this gives a lower bound of 48/35 for the Price of Anarchy.
Notice that our lower bound for k = 4 is smaller than for k = 3. None the less, all these
examples can be shown to provide tight lower bounds for their corresponding cases k = 2, 3, 4,
by usage of simple arguments and explicit treatment of the left-hand side of (6). For k = 2,
our argument is that the worst-case instance occurs when there is a single winner in the social
optimum; otherwise, if there are 2 winners, they also remain winners in undominated pure Nash
equilibrium (due to Lemma 2) and the Price of Anarchy is 1. In the worst-case instance though,
the bidder being a winner (of 2 units) in the social optimum remains a winner (of exactly 1 unit)
in the undominated pure Nash equilibrium. Taking xi = 1, x
∗
i = 2, ri = 1 in the left-hand side
of (6), sufficies to obtain 34vi(x
∗
i ).
For the case of k = 3 the reasoning is similar. There have to be strictly less than 3 winners in
the social optimum for, otherwise, the allocation coincides with that of an undominated pure Nash
equilibrium. Now, if there are 2 winners, one of them obtains only 1 unit (out of k = 3) in both,
socially optimal allocation and undominated equilibrium allocation. Thus, the social inefficiency
is due to the other winner losing one unit in equilibrium (of the 2 that he obtains in the social
optimum). By our experience with k = 2(and by Lemma 4), this example cannot have Price of
Anarchy more than 4/3. Thus, we may assume that there exists a single winner in the social
optimum. To achieve maximum welfare “damage” in undominated pure Nash equilibrium, this
single winner of 3 units loses 2 of them in equilibrium and we apply (6) appropriately, to obtain
an upper bound of 18/13. For k = 4 the reasoning uses our experience from both previous cases.
We exclude instances with 4, 3 and 2 winners in the social optimum, as they cannot have Price
of Anarchy more than 1, 4/3, 18/13 respectively. For maximum welfare damage, we assume that
the single winner loses 3 out of 4 units in undominated pure Nash equilibrium.
The following more general lower bound is valid for at least k ≥ 9 units. For the remaining
values of k = 5, 6, 7, 8, we do not have any tighter upper and lower bounds.
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Theorem 2 For any k ≥ 9, the Uniform Price Auction recovers in undominated pure Nash
equilibrium at most a factor (1 − e−1 + 2k ) of the optimal social welfare, even for 2 submodular
bidders.
Proof. Consider k ≥ 9 units and 2 bidders. For q = be−1 · k − 1c (notice that q ≥ 1) define the
valuation functions to be:
v1(x) = x and v2(x) =
{
x− q · (Hk −Hk−x) x ≤ k − q
k − q · (1 +Hk −Hq) x > k − q
where Hm is the m-th harmonic number. Notice that the marginal values of bidder 2 are equal to
0 for x > k − q. It can be verified that v2 is symmetric submodular in x:
v2(x) = x− q ·
(
Hk −Hk−x
)
=
x∑
j=1
(
1− q
k − j + 1
)
=
x∑
j=1
r − j + 1
k − j + 1
where r = k−q. Then r−j+1k−j+1 ≤ r−j+2k−j+2 = r−(j−1)+1k−(j−1)+1 , thus v2(x)−v2(x−1) ≤ v2(x−1)−v2(x−2),
for x ≤ k − q; for x > k − q, v2(x) = v2(x− 1), thus v2 is submodular.
For the optimal social welfare we grant all units to bidder 1, i.e. x = (k, 0, . . . , 0) and obtain
a total welfare SW (x∗) = k. For the equilibrium configuration b we set:
b1(j) =
{
1, for j ≤ q
0, for j > q
b2(j) =
{
r−j+1
k−j+1 , for j ≤ r = k − q
0, for j > r
Thus, under b, q units are obtained by bidder 1 and k − q units by bidder 2. We show that b
is a pure Nash equilibrium. Notice that bidder 2 is essentially truthful in this profile and may not
increase his bids further so as to obtain another unit (given that he plays undominated strategies).
On the other hand, the uniform price is 0 in this setting, so bidder 2 does obtain the maximum
of his utility for the won units. Bidder 1 also pays the uniform price of 0, so he does not have
incentive to drop any of his units. Should bidder 1 try to retain any j ≤ r of the r = k − q units
held by bidder 2, the uniform price would become jk−r+j and bidder 1 will hold a total of k− r+ j
units. The marginal gain from bidder 1 obtaining the extra j units is cancelled out by a total
payment equal to j; thus bidder 1 does not have incentive to deviate under b.
For the social welfare of b we have:
SW (b) = v1(q) + v2(r) = q + r − q ·
(
Hk −Hq
)
= k − q ·
(
Hk −Hq
)
= k ·
(
1− qk · (Hk −Hq)
)
Then, the Price of Anarchy is at least:
k
k ·
(
1− qk · (Hk −Hq)
) = (1− q
k
·
(
Hk −Hq
))−1
≥
(
1− e
−1 · k − 2
k
·
∫ k
q+1
1
y
dy
)−1
=
(
1− e
−1 · k − 2
k
· ln kbe−1k − 1c+ 1
)−1
≥
(
1− e−1 + 2
k
)−1
where we used Hk−Hq =
∑k
r=q+1
1
r ≥
∫ k+1
q+1
1
ydy ≥
∫ k
q+1
1
ydy, for monotonically decreasing positive
functions; the final derivation follows by q + 1 ≤ e−1 · k and be−1k − 1c+ 1 ≥ e−1k 2
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6 Bayes-Nash Inefficiency with Undominated Support
In this section we investigate the social inefficiency of (mixed) Bayes-Nash equilibria for bidders
with submodular valuation functions. Just as in the case of pure equilibria we focused on undom-
inated strategies, here we will focus on mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria that are supported by pure
undominated strategies. We wish to note, however, that the assumption of undominated support
is only marginally restrictive for the main (social inefficiency) result described in this section; it
guarantees the properties given by Lemmas 1 and 2, that allow us to prove a tighter inefficiency
bound. In the end of this section we discuss how our analysis leads to a similar (slightly worse)
bound, under the standard assumption of no-overbidding used, e.g., in [5, 2, 11].
Following [5, 2], to ensure the existence of mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria, we make the assump-
tion of a finite bidding space for bidders under sufficiently fine discretization. We claim that such
mixed Bayes-Nash equilibria supported by undominated pure strategies exist for the case of bid-
ders with submodular valuation functions. Indeed, consider a Bayesian game where the strategy
space of each player is bounded (e.g. of the form [0, U ], where U is a sufficiently large upper bound
on the values of all bidders) and finite, through some sufficiently fine discretization.
We first claim that in our setting there always exists a Bayes-Nash equilibrium where all
strategies used in its support are not weakly dominated. Then we will claim that these strategies
are conservative w.r.t. marginal bids. To argue about these statements, we use two well known
facts from game theory. The first one is that a Bayes-Nash equilibrium B can be seen as a Nash
equilibrium of a complete information game (see e.g. [26][Chapter 9]), where the set of players is
the set of pairs (i, vi) for every i = 1, ..., n and vi ∈ Vi, and the strategy space of player (i, vi) is
the same as the strategy space of i in the Bayesian game. For a given mixed strategy profile B in
this game, the utility function of player (i, vi), denoted by u
vi
i (B), is:
uvii (B) = Ev−i|vi
[
E
b∼B(vi,v−i)
[
ui(b)
]]
=
∑
v−i∈V−i
pi(v−i)Eb∼B(vi,v−i)
[
ui(b)
]
Note that the utility of a player (i, vi) does not depend on the action of other pairs that involve
i, (i.e., on the other types of player i). Since this complete-information game is a finite game it
possesses a mixed Nash equilibrium. It is well known that in any finite game there always exists a
mixed equilibrium where no weakly dominated action is contained in the support of each player’s
strategy (see [26] [Section 4.4]). Putting everything together, we have that there always exists
a Bayes-Nash equilibrium where every strategy used in its support is not weakly dominated. It
is an easy exercise to verify the validity of Lemma 1 for a sufficiently fine discretization of the
strategy space and that Lemma 2 holds, for any such discretization that does not exclude the
actual marginal values from the bidders’ strategy space.
We introduce some auxiliary notation for the analysis that follows. For any valuation profile
v ∈ V let xv = (xv1 , . . . , xvn) denote the socially optimal assignment. For any particular bidder
i ∈ [n] let U i ⊆ V denote the subset of valuation profiles v ∈ V where xvi ≥ 1, i.e., U i = {v ∈
V|xvi ≥ 1}; these are the profiles under which i is a “social optimum winner”. Accordingly, we let
Wv denote the subset of “social optimum winners” in valuation profile v ∈ V. Given any (pure)
bidding profile b, we use the “operator” βj(b) here as well, to denote the j-th lowest winning bid
in b, as in Section 5. The following Lemma will serve the purpose of lower bounding the Social
Welfare of a profile b by a sum of the winning bids (much like inequalities (19) and (20) along
with Lemma 1 did, in the proof of Lemma 4 in the previous section).
Lemma 5 For a valuation profile v, let b denote an arbitrary pure bidding profile in undominated
strategies, p(b) be the uniform price under b and let x∗ be the efficient (socially optimal) assign-
ment of k units to ` ≤ k winning bidders w.r.t. v. Fix an arbitrary ordering of the ` winning
bidders under x∗ and define ti = dx
∗
i
2 e, i = 1, . . . , `. Then:∑
1≤i≤`
tiβti(b−i) ≤ p(b) +
k − 1
k
SW (b) (8)
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To ease our way towards the main result of this section, we defer the technical proof of this Lemma
to the end of our exposition, along with a discussion on how to replace the undominated support
assumption with the no-overbidding assumption.
The following Lemma facilitates the expression of BNE conditions regarding unilateral devi-
ations, and has been proved in a different form and under a different context (for simultaneous
single-unit auctions with combinatorial bidders) also in [5, 2]. We provide its proof here for
completeness.
Lemma 6 For every bidder i ∈ [n] with submodular valuation vi define the bidding vector m[j]i =
(mi(1),mi(2), . . . ,mi(j), 0, 0, . . . , 0) . For any conservative bidding profile b−i, and for any number
of units j ∈ {0, 1, . . . , k}:
ui(m
[j]
i ,b−i) ≥ vi(j)− j · βj(b−i).
The proof of this lemma for our setting is given in Appendix C. Now we can show the main
result of this section:
Theorem 3 The Price of Anarchy of Bayes-Nash Equilibria with undominated support in Uniform
Price Auctions for bidders with submodular valuation functions is at most 4− 2k .
Proof. Consider a Bayes-Nash equilibrium B. Fix a bidder i and any valuation profile v =
(vi,v−i) ∈ V. For tvi =
⌈
xvi
2
⌉
, and for any valuation profile w−i ∈ V−i and strategy b−i ∼ Bw−i−i ,
we apply Lemma 6. Then, we take the expectation over the randomized strategies of the other
bidders and, subsequently, over all valuation profiles w−i ∈ V−i, to obtain:
Ew−i|vi
[
E
b−i∼Bw−i−i [ui(m
[tvi ]
i ,b−i)]
]
≥ vi(tvi )− tvi · Ew−i|vi
[
E
b−i∼Bw−i−i [βt
v
i
(b−i)]
]
≥ vi(x
v
i )
2
− Ew
[
Eb∼Bw
[
tvi · βtvi (b−i)
]]
(9)
The second inequality is justified as follows. By independence of the distributions {pii | i ∈ [n]},
we have that for any i ∈ [n] and any vi ∈ Vi:∑
w−i
pi(w−i|vi) =
∑
w−i
pi(w−i) =
∑
w−i
pi(w−i)
∑
wi
pi(wi)
=
∑
(wi,w−i)
pi(w−i|wi)pii(wi) = 1 =
∑
w
pi(w)
Also, by submodularity (Proposition 1) and monotonicity of valuation functions: vi(t
v
i ) =
vi(dx
v
i
2 e) ≥ 12vi(xvi ). Because under BNE B, bidder i does not have an incentive to deviate, we
have:
Ew−i|vi
[
E
b∼B(vi,w−i) [ui(b)]
]
≥ Ew−i|vi
[
E
b−i∼Bw−i−i [ui(m
[tvi ]
i ,b−i)]
]
Thus:
Ew−i|vi
[
Eb∼B(vi,w−i) [ui(b)]
]
+ Ew
[
Eb∼Bw
[
tvi · βtvi (b−i)
]]
≥ vi(x
v
i )
2
We take expectation of both sides over the distribution of v ∈ V and summing over all bidders
yields the final expression:
11
∑
i
∑
v∈V
pi(v) · Ew−i|vi
[
E
b∼B(vi,w−i)
[
ui(b)
]]
+
∑
i
∑
v∈V
pi(v) · Ew
[
Eb∼Bw
[
tvi · βtvi (b−i)
]]
≥
∑
i
∑
v∈V
pi(v) · vi(x
v
i )
2
=
∑
v∈V
pi(v)
∑
i∈Wv
vi(x
v
i )
2
=
1
2
Ev[SW (xv)] (10)
The last equality holds since it is enough to sum over i ∈ Wv, to compute the welfare produced
at the optimal assignment with respect to v. We show in Appendix C that the first summand
of the left-hand side of (10) satisfies:
∑
i
∑
v∈Ui
pi(v) · Ew−i|vi
[
E
b∼B(vi,w−i)
[
ui(b)
]]
= Ev
[
Eb∼Bv
[∑
i
ui(b)
]]
(11)
Similarly, we have for the second summand on the left-hand side of (10):
∑
i
∑
v∈Ui
pi(v) · Ew
[
Eb∼Bw
[
tvi · βtvi (b−i)
]]
=
∑
i
∑
v∈Ui
pi(v)
∑
w∈V
pi(w) · Eb∼Bw
[
tvi · βtvi (b−i)
]
=
∑
v∈V
pi(v)
∑
i∈Wv
∑
w∈V
pi(w) · Eb∼Bw
[
tvi · βtvi (b−i)
]
=
∑
v∈V
pi(v)
∑
w∈V
pi(w) · Eb∼Bw
[ ∑
i∈Wv
tvi · βtvi (b−i)
]
= Ev
[
Eb∼Bv
[ ∑
i∈Wv
tvi · βtvi (b−i)
]]
(12)
Note that in the first term above, we sum only over v ∈ U i, since for v 6∈ U i, tvi = 0. By (27), (12)
and (10), we obtain:
Ev
[
Eb∼Bv
[∑
i
ui(b) +
∑
i∈Wv
tvi · βtvi (b−i)
]]
≥ 1
2
Ev[SW (xv)] (13)
To finish the proof, we substitute the second sum inside the expectation by its upper bound as
given by Lemma 5 in (8). Notice that p(b) appearing in (8) is absorbed by the payment appearing
in the utility ui(b) of at least one bidder. Thus we obtain:
Ev
[
Eb∼Bv
[∑
i
vi
(
xi(b)
)
+
k − 1
k
SW (b)
]]
≥ 1
2
Ev[SW (xv)]
which essentially concludes the proof, by
∑
i vi
(
xi(b)
)
= SW (b). 2
To complete our arguments for the proof of Theorem 3, we prove Lemma 5. Subsequently, we
comment on how our arguments can be adjusted for the case of Bayes-Nash equilibria supported
by general no-overbidding strategies (i.e., not restricted to undominated ones), to yield an upper
bound of 4 for the Price of Anarchy.
Proof of Lemma 5. For the winning bidders i = 1, . . . , ` we have x∗i ≥ 1. Define ψi =
∑
j≤i x
∗
j .
First, we prove by induction on i that:
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∑
1≤j≤i
tjβtj (b−j) ≤ βt1(b−1) +
∑
1≤j≤ψi−1
βj(b). (14)
For the basic step of the induction, consider i = 1; then:
t1βt1(b−1) ≤ βt1(b−1) + (t1 − 1)βt1(b) (15)
≤ βt1(b−1) +
2t1−2∑
j=t1
βj(b)
= βt1(b−1) +
∑
j≤ψ1−1
βj(b)
Assuming (14) holds for i > 1, we show it remains true for i+ 1. We have:∑
j≤i+1
tjβj(b−j) =
∑
j≤i
tjβj(b−j) +
(
ti+1βti+1(b−(i+1))
)
≤ βt1(b−1) +
∑
j≤ψi−1
βj(b) +
(
ti+1βti+1(b)
)
≤ βt1(b−1) +
∑
j≤ψi+1−1
βj(b) (16)
where (16) is justified as follows: for any value of ψi ≥ 1, we have βti+1(b) ≤ βj(b), for all
j = ψi − 1 +
⌈
x∗i+1
2
⌉
, . . . , ψi − 1 + x∗i+1 (a total of at least
⌈
x∗i+1
2
⌉
= ti+1 inequalities). By
ψi+1 = ψi + x
∗
i+1, we obtain (16) and, thus, (14). Setting i = `, thus, ψ` = k in (14), we have:
∑
1≤i≤`
tiβti(b−i) ≤ βt1(b−1) +
k−1∑
j=1
βj(b) ≤ βt1(b−1) + SW (b)− βk(b) (17)
For every bidder i with x∗i ≥ 1, it must be also xi(b) ≥ 1, because the profile b consists
of undominated strategies, thus, bi(1) = mi(1) = vi(1). Because βk(b) = maxi,j bi(j), by sub-
modularity of valuation functions and by no-overbidding with respect to marginal bids, there
exists a bidder i1 such that bi1(1) = vi1(1) = mi1(1) = βk(b). Then, βk(b) = mi1(1) is also
the largest marginal value contributed to SW (b) and mi(1) ≥ SW (b)/k. Moreover, for every
bidder i, it must hold that bi(1) = mi(1) = vi(1) ≥ βx∗i (b), i.e., bi(1) is at least the x∗i -th bid in
β1(b), . . . , βk(b); otherwise, at least one bid in b is beyond the marginal value of some bidder,
which also contradicts b consisting of undominated strategies. Then, for any bidder i with x∗i ≥ 1
we have that: βti(b−i) ≤ p(b), because at least x∗i ≥ ti non-winning marginal bids in b (including
p(b)) become the lowest winning in b−i. This yields βt1(b−1) ≤ p(b) and we obtain (8) from (17).
2
We used our assumption of undominated support essentially only in the analysis that fol-
lows (17). If we replace this assumption with the standard no-overbidding assumption, we can
continue our analysis from (17), by noticing that βt1(b−1) ≤ βt1(b−1) ≤ βk(b). Thus, (8) can be
replaced by: ∑
1≤i≤`
tiβti(b−i) ≤ SW (b).
We can use this latter upper bound in (13), along with
∑
i ui(b) ≤
∑
i vi(b) = SW (b), to obtain
an upper bound of 4 on the Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy.
Corollary 1 The mixed Bayes-Nash Price of Anarchy of the Uniform Price Auction for non-
overbidding bidders with submodular valuation functions is at most 4.
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Appendix A: Omitted Proofs from Section 4
Proof of Lemma 1
Fix any bidder i with a submodular valuation function vi and consider a bidding vector bi =
(bi(1), . . . , bi(k)) of i, where bi(1) ≥ bi(2) ≥ ... ≥ bi(k), as required by the bidding rule of the
auction. Suppose that for some j, bidder i overbids the marginal value for the j-th unit, i.e.,
bi(j) > mi(j). We will construct a bidding vector b
′
i and we will show that b
′
i weakly dominates
bi. We define b
′
i as follows: b
′
i(r) = bi(r) for any r ≤ j − 1, and b′i(r) = mi(r) for every r ≥ j.
Note that this is a valid bidding vector for the auction (this holds because b′i(j − 1) = bi(j − 1) ≥
bi(j) > mi(j)). We show that: for every b−i, ui(b′i,b−i) ≥ ui(bi,b−i) and the inequality is strict
for at least one vector b−i.
For a configuration b−i of the other bidders, let p(b) denote the uniform price under b =
(bi,b−i). We start first, with configurations b−i for which j > xi(b). In this case, if bidder i
plays according to b′i, he will retain at least the same utility, because bi(j) does not grant him
any unit and neither does mi(j). Hence, he will keep winning under b
′
i the same number of units
and if his j-th bid was the price-setting bid, the price may even decrease and he will be strictly
better. Consider now configurations b−i for which j ≤ xi(b). We examine the following subcases:
(I): p(b) < mi(xi(b)). Then, by playing b
′
i, bidder i will still win the same number of units as
before. The price under (b′i, b−i) will either remain the same or may decrease in the case that
the price-setting bid was an overbid by bidder i.
(II): p(b) = mi(xi(b)). In this case, various scenarios may occur depending on the possible
configurations for b−i, and on the possible appearance of ties. First, by switching to b′i, bidder
i will either win the same number of units as before, or he may win less if some tie is resolved
against him. In the cases that he wins the same number of units as in b, it is easy to see that the
price has either remained the same or it may even have fallen, e.g., if the price-setting bid in b was
bi(xi(b) + 1) > mi(xi(b) + 1), which is reduced in b
′
i to mi(xi(b) + 1). Hence bidder i has at least
the same utility as before. In the cases where bidder i wins less units, the only possibility is that
the price has remained the same and it is only because of ties that i lost some of his previously
won units. But then for the units that he lost, their marginal value is the same as the price, hence
bidder i simply had zero utility for them in b. Thus he will still have the same utility under b′i as
before.
(III): p(b) > mi(xi(b)). Then in b, i overpays his marginal value for at least one won unit; in
this case bidder i can switch to b′i and strictly increase his utility. To see this, note that under
(b′i,b−i) bidder i will still win the units that give him nonnegative utility (i.e., have marginal
value at least p(b)), and he will lose only units that he could not afford anyway.
Conclusively, overbidding any marginal value is a weakly dominated strategy for every bidder i.2
Proof of Lemma 2
By Lemma 1, undominated strategies are conservative w.r.t. marginal bids, thus no bidder may
exaggerate his bid for the first unit. Let bi denote such a bidding vector for bidder i, where bi(1) <
mi(1). Let b
′
i denote the bidding vector where b
′
i(1) = mi(1) and b
′
i(j) = bi(j), for j = 2, . . . , k.
For any configuration b−i due to all other bidders, we show that: ui(b′i,b−i) ≥ ui(b′i,b−i) and
the inequality is strict for at least one such b−i.
If xi(bi,b−i) ≥ 1, bidder i will maintain his allocation and his utility by increasing bi(1) to
mi(1) = b
′
i(1). If xi(bi,b−i) = 0, then an increase of bi(1) to mi(1) = b
′
i(1) will either maintain
the utility of i to 0 (if the current minimum winning bid is at least equal to mi(1)), or increase it
(if the current minimum winning bid is less than mi(1)). In the latter case, i wins one unit and
the minimum winning bid of (bi,b−i) becomes the new uniform price that i pays exactly once.
Conclusively, bidding bi(1) < vi(1) is a weakly dominated strategy. 2
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Appendix B: Proof of Lemma 4
Let b be any pure Nash equilibrium configuration in undominated strategies. For simplicity we
use xi for xi(b) and βj for βj(b), j = 1, . . . , k. For SW (b) we have:
SW (b) =
∑
i∈W0(x)
vi(xi) +
∑
i∈W1(x)
vi(xi) +
∑
i∈W2(x)
vi(xi) (18)
By definition of W0, we can write the first term of (18),
∑
i∈W0(x) vi(xi), as:
∑
i∈W0(x)
(
vi(x
∗
i ) + vi(xi)− vi(x∗i )
)
=
∑
i∈W0(x)
vi(x∗i ) + xi∑
j=1+x∗i
mi(j)

≥
∑
i∈W0(x)
vi(x∗i ) + xi∑
j=1+x∗i
bi(j)
 (19)
The last inequality is due to the fact that b is an undominated pure Nash equilibrium, thus,
Lemma 1 applies. For the third term of (18), we have similarly:
∑
i∈W2(x)
vi(xi) =
∑
i∈W2(x)
xi∑
j=1
mi(j) ≥
∑
i∈W2(x)
xi∑
j=1
bi(j) (20)
Substituting (19) and (20) in (18), we obtain:
SW (b) ≥
∑
i∈W0(x)
vi(x∗i ) + xi∑
j=1+x∗i
bi(j)
+ ∑
i∈W1(x)
vi(xi) +
∑
i∈W2(x)
xi∑
j=1
bi(j)
Observe that, for every unit missed under b by any bidder i ∈ W(x∗) ∩ W1(x), there exists a
bidder i′ ∈ W0(x) ∪W2(x) that obtains this unit. If i missed x∗i − xi > 0 units in b, there are at
least as many bids issued by bidders in W0(x) ∪W2(x), that won collectively these units. These
bids sum up to at least
∑x∗i−xi
j=1 βj , i.e. the sum of the x
∗
i − xi lowest winning bids in b. I.e.:
∑
i∈W0(x)
xi∑
j=1+x∗i
bi(j) +
∑
i∈W2(x)
xi∑
j=1
bi(j) ≥
∑
i∈W1(x)
x∗i−xi∑
j=1
βj (21)
Using (21) in the last lower bounding expression of SW (b), we obtain:
SW (b) ≥
∑
i∈W0(x)
vi(x
∗
i ) +
∑
i∈W1(x)
(
vi(xi) +
x∗i−xi∑
j=1
βj
)
(22)
Finally, we notice that W0(x) and W1(x) are a partition of W(x∗), thus:
SW (b∗) =
∑
i∈W0(x)
vi(x
∗
i ) +
∑
i∈W1(x)
vi(x
∗
i ) (23)
By (22) and (23) we obtain (1). 2
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Appendix C: Omitted Proofs from Section 6
Proof of Lemma 6
Fix any player i. The statement trivially holds for j = 0, hence consider j ≥ 1. For any bidding
configuration b−i, we let β1(b−i) ≤ · · · ≤ βk(b−i) denote the winning bids, if i was not present,
in non-decreasing order. Fix also the index j (1 ≤ j ≤ k), and using the submodular valuation
function vi of i, define the bidding vector m
[j]
i = (mi(1), . . . ,mi(j), 0, . . . , 0).
Assume that bidder i has won s units in the configuration (m
[j]
i ,b−i). Obviously s ≤ j. Let p
denote the price that he pays for these units. In the case that s = j, p = βj(b−i), and the statement
of the Lemma trivially holds. In the case that s < j, we have that p = max{mi(s+ 1), βs(b−i)}.
This is because the highest losing bid may be either the next bid of bidder i (i.e., mi(s + 1)), or
the highest losing bid in b−i, which is βs(b−i). This implies that p ≤ βj(b−i). Thus we can derive
the following bound on the utility of bidder i:
ui(m
[j]
i ,b−i) ≥ vi(s)− s · βj(b−i)
≥ vi(s)− s · βj(b−i) +
j−s∑
r=1
(mi(s+ r)− βj(b−i))
= vi(s) +
j−s∑
r=1
mi(s+ r)− j · βj(b−i)
= vi(j)− j · βj(b−i)
The second inequality above holds because mi(s+r) ≤ mi(s+1) ≤ βj(b−i) for all marginal values
beyond the s-th one. This completes the proof. 2
Omitted Part of Proof of Theorem 3
Consider the first of the two summands of (10). We explain the derivations below.
∑
i
∑
v∈V
pi(v)Ew−i|vi
[
E
b∼B(vi,w−i)
[
ui(b)
]]
(24)
=
∑
i
∑
v−i∈V−i
pi(v−i|vi)
∑
vi∈Vi
pii(vi)
∑
w−i∈V−i
pi(w−i|vi)Eb∼B(vi,w−i)
[
ui(b)
]
=
∑
i
∑
vi∈Vi
pii(vi)
∑
v−i∈V−i
pi(v−i|vi)
∑
w−i∈V−i
pi(w−i|vi)Eb∼B(vi,w−i)
[
ui(b)
]
=
∑
i
∑
vi∈Vi
pii(vi)
∑
w−i∈V−i
pi(w−i|vi)Eb∼B(vi,w−i)
[
ui(b)
]
(25)
=
∑
v∈V
pi(v)
∑
i
Eb∼B(vi,w−i)
[
ui(b)
]
(26)
=
∑
v∈V
pi(v)Eb∼Bv
[∑
i
ui(b)
]
= Ev
[
Eb∼Bv
[∑
i
ui(b)
]]
(27)
To obtain the equality following (24), we analyze
∑
v∈V pi(v) to:∑
v−i∈V−i
pi(v−i)
∑
vi∈Vi
pii(vi) =
∑
(vi,v−i)
pi(v−i|vi)pi(vi)
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For (25), it suffices to move
∑
v−i∈V−i pi(v−i|vi) all the way to the right and observe that it equals
1 by independence of the valuation distributions. Finally, we obtain ((26) by condensing:∑
i
∑
vi∈Vi
pii(vi)
∑
w−i∈V−i
pi(w−i|vi)
into
∑
v∈V pi(v) and moving
∑
i to the right, to sum over the expected valuations of bidders for
every valuation profile v ∈ V.
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